Abstract-Many companies rent Virtual Machines (VM) from cloud providers to meet their computational needs. While this option is also available to end-users, they take advantage of this option much less. One reason may be that it is common to pay on a per-VM-basis, whereas the telecommunications sector has shown that customers prefer flat rates. A flat rate for cloud services needs to define utilization thresholds, to cap the usage of heavy customers and thereby limit their impact on the flat rate price and the cloud performance. Unfortunately, customers consume multiple heterogenous resources in clouds, e.g., CPU, RAM, disk I/O, or network access. This makes the definition of a customer's fair "cloud share" and according utilization thresholds complex.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud Computing (CC) is a computing paradigm enabled by the growing connectivity provided by modern communication systems combined with virtualization technology [25] . CC allows server farms to provide their combined computing power on demand to customers, such as end-users and companies. To process a workload through CC a customer starts Virtual Machines (VM) in the cloud that process the workload. In particular, a cloud processes varying workloads efficiently by dynamically starting VMs, which are defined by Virtual Resources (VR), e.g., virtual CPU (VCPU) and virtual RAM (VRAM).
Resources in private clouds are often managed by quotas, i.e., each user has a quota defining a maximum of VRs that his VMs may have in total. As opposed to this, in commercial clouds, it is common practice that customers pay on a per-VM-basis (different prices for different VM configurations apply). However, the telecommunications sector has shown that customers often prefer flat rates [1] , [20] , [21] , [22] , even if a volume-based tariff would reduce costs [17] . With a cloud flat rate customers pay a monthly fee to get access to a cloud, where they can start VMs. Just as Internet flat rates come with a maximum bandwidth, cloud flat rate customers would get a certain quota to spawn VMs from. However, this mechanism is neither sufficient to cap costs that individual customers cause nor to ensure fairness between customers, because (i) customers often deploy different amounts of their quota and (ii) VMs may have very different loads. In particular, (i) means that some customers may only operate a few VMs leaving most of their quota unused, while others fully utilize their quota. However, (ii) describes the more important fact that customers may burden their VMs with very different workloads. That is, even if customers create exactly the same number and types of VMs, the costs they cause varies depending on how they utilize their VMs. This becomes even more relevant, because VMs on the same host compete for resources, i.e., a heavily loaded VM may impair the performance of other VMs on the same host. Therefore, when clouds are shared via flat rates, it is desirable to limit VMs of heavy customers in favor of VMs of more moderate customers, such that VMs of moderate customers are not impaired by VMs of heavy customers. While technical means to enforce fairness in this way exist [2] , [11] , [13] , cloud fairness is neither sufficiently enforced nor explored [7] , [10] , [15] , [16] , [26] . Here, multi-resource implies that the bundles, which are allocated to the consumers, consist of multiple heterogenous resources and the non-accessibility of utility functions implies that the definition can not be based on how much consumers valuate different bundles (a consumer's utility function maps each bundle to a number that quantifies the consumer's valuation for the bundle).
The problem of cloud fairness is often addressed by VM scheduling [3] , [9] , i.e., deciding which VM should be started next, which is insufficient to streamline actual resource utilization during runtime. Other approaches make assumptions about the utility functions of VMs [7] , [10] , [26] . This paper, therefore, defines the Greediness Metric (GM) to quantify the commensurability of VMs' runtime resource utilization, i.e., how fair VMs behave. Because fairness is an intuitive concept, that is, differs from person to person, the conformance of the GM with an intuitive understanding of fairness is verified by a questionnaire among more than 600 participants. The GM is applied on each host of a cloud to quantify the greediness of each VM. This greediness of VMs is inquired from each host and the greediness of each customer's VMs are summed together. These sums are returned to all hosts, such that hosts can constrain VMs of customers with a high sum, if congestion on any resource occurs. In this way, VM greediness is aggregated to customer greediness, such that local (per host) resource allocations to VMs can be adapted to ensure global (between customers) fairness.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II discusses related work leading to the research question stated in Section III. Section IV outlines the questionnaire, presents its results, and discusses key findings. Based on these outcomes, the new Greediness Metric (GM) is defined in Section V and evaluated in Section VI. Section VII summarizes key insights gained and draws conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
Fairness is an illusive concept, i.e., differs form person to person. However, for a single resource, the size of bundles can be quantified, and thus, the value of bundles objectively compared. Therefore, fairness can be intuitively defined as Max-Min-Fairness [24] and quantified by metrics such as [14] , [18] , [28] . While such allocation problems were extensively studied in computer science [5] , [24] , the multi-resource allocation received much less attention by computer scientists. In economics, fairness of multi-resource allocations is defined by envy-freeness [4] , i.e., no consumer prefers to swap his bundle with another. However, such definition is only applicable, when consumer's utility functions are known.
As noted in [7] , [10] , [15] , [16] , [23] , [26] , multi-resource allocation in data centers is so far not fully investigated and often reduced to single-resource allocation problems at the cost of efficiency and fairness [10] , [19] . In data centers consumers share resources, such as CPU time, RAM, Disk I/O and space, and network access, wherefore it is necessary to define fairness when every consumer receives a bundle of multiple heterogenous resources. Clouds are a special case of data centers where resources are deployed via VMs in a highly dynamic manner. The assumption in literature is that the resource utilization of jobs, which are the entities consuming resources in data centers, is static [7] , [10] . Accordingly, approaches to fairness in data centers focus on scheduling, i.e., which job should be started next. However, because VMs change their resource utilization, resource allocation in clouds is more complex and cannot be reduced to VM scheduling. Subsequently, approaches to multi-resource fairness in data centers (especially their cloud instances) are compared, while ignoring numerous approaches focusing on a single resource. Table II shows this overview of approaches by comparing them in terms of the adopted fairness definition, the application area, and the assumed utility function. Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) is the most prominent approach to introduce multi-resource fairness in data centers [9] . DRF defines the value of a bundle as the biggest proportion relative to the total supply of any resource in it (c.f. Section IV-C1d). Therefore, to define the value of a bundle only one resource is considered, which is also known as the L 1 norm. A DRF fair allocation is the allocation that maximizes this value for every consumer. [12] points out that for many other functions (including all other L i2N norms) a unique allocation exists that can be found in polynomial time, but that the authors of DRF never argue why their choice is superior. Leontief utility functions model that resources are [19] Fair on progress shares Scheduling by profiling/static [25] Not defined Scheduling Upon requests [16] Priority functions Runtime Not needed GM Based on questionnaire Runtime Not needed required in static ratios, i.e., increasing the amount a consumer receives of one resource does not increase his utility if his share of all other resources is not increased by the same factor. While all proofs for DRF's desirable properties are based on Leontief utility functions [9] , [10] , [23] , the actual DRF scheduling algorithm, as proposed in [9] , [10] , allows consumers to request different resource bundles. Therefore, in the scheduling process, consumers can have arbitrary utility functions, but DRF's properties are only proven for Leontief utility functions. [27] points out that in practice DRF may not allocate desired resources to a consumer, although it would not hurt other consumers. [23] justifies that DRF may perform poor with respect to overall system utilization/social welfare by impossibility results for sharing policies with DRF's properties. However, [3] shows that proportional fairness is superior to DRF in terms of efficiency and comes with the same desirable characteristics under realistic assumptions. In particular, [3] argues that DRF's desirable properties are proven for simplistic micro-economic assumptions. [12] extends DRF to perfectly complementary utility functions and allows all monotonic and continuous functions to measure the value of bundles. While [12] shows that for this generalization a unique allocation exists, which can also be found in polynomial time, it remains open whether this approach is strategy-proof or envy-free. Bottleneck-based fairness (BBF) was introduced in [7] , [8] . An allocation is bottleneck-based fair, if every consumer either is allocated all requested resources or at least the equal share on a fully utilized/bottleneck resource and the other resource in proportion to this bottleneck. [27] defines a multi-resource on-line scheduling policy that achieves BBF without knowing consumer's utility functions in advance.
[26] presents an allocation policy that achieves gametheoretic fairness, i.e., sharing incentive, envy freeness, and pareto-efficiency, when allocating cache capacity and memory bandwidth. [26] profiles different applications to convincingly argue that Cobb-douglas utility functions are well suited to model diminishing returns and substitution effects, when cache capacity and memory bandwidth are consumed. The authors note that also other microarchitectural cloud resources, e.g., number of processor cores, could be allocated by their mechanism.
The results in [6] are all theoretic in nature. A mechanism is presented that may hold resources back, to incentivize con-sumers to be truthful and, thereby, ensure strategy-proofness. This behavior is theoretically justified by showing that no strategy-prove mechanism can guarantee to every consumer a utility greater than 0.5 of the proportional fair utility. However, it makes the mechanism unattractive to be deployed in practice due to its artificially decreased efficiency.
[19] considers fairness of progress shares, which "capture the contribution of each resource to the progress of a job". Since the special case of data analytics in the cloud is considered, it is possible to assume a constant VM demand, which is not the case in general.
Although [25] considers the realistic case where consumers may lie about their utility functions over multiple resources, it is not elaborated how fairness is defined.
[16] considers the fair sharing of grids between customers and research groups. It points out that clusters, which provide several resources, such as CPU time, RAM, GPUs, and HDD storage, are often shared based on priorities, which solely depend on utilized CPU time. They point to situations, where a customer utilizes 100% of a machine's RAM, but only 10% CPU. This makes the remaining 90% of CPU unusable, while the customer is only accounted for a 10% usage. Contrary to all other approaches discussed in this section, [16] achieves fairness by a penalty/priority function, which is close to our approach. In particular, such function determines the priority of consumers when granting resource requests. Such approach is much more practically oriented, because no assumptions about utility functions need to be made. [16] is dedicated to finding a penalty function that suffices five requirements and compares different penalty functions with respect to these requirements. [16] proves that three of these requirements cannot be achieved simultaneously. Furthermore, the sum-based-penalty function that suffices all but one requirement and the root-based-penalty function that suffices all but another requirement are presented.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
While fairness issues arise in many areas of (human) coexistence, for example, when asking the question of how a governing coalition shall be formed in a parliamentary system or how this coalition, once formed, shall allocate cabinet ministries [4] , the allocation of resources is probably the most basic context in which fairness issues arise.
The characteristic of fair cloud resource allocations, which is distinct for this context, is that customers (between whom fairness is to be defined) utilize resources from different resource pools (hosts) by intermediaries (VMs). While fairness has to be achieved between customers, this has to be done by allocating resources to their VMs. Unfortunately resources can only be moved between VMs, which run on the same host. However, besides this structural problem, also a more general problem is faced: Defining and enforcing fairness of multi-resource allocations without knowing consumers' utility functions. In particular, because bundles consist of multiple heterogenous resources, bundles can contain resources in different amounts, This prohibits an objective comparison of bundles. For example, some customers may require more CPU for their workloads, while others require more RAM [19] . A third customer may deploy the cloud for backups and, therefore, mostly requires disk-space and bandwidth. Therefore, consumers can have different preferences over the same bundles.
Because utility functions of consumers in clouds are unknown (cf. Section II), it is not possible to define fairness via utility functions here and, thus, fairness has to be defined via bundles that VMs serve themselves. In particular, hosts work as "self-serving stores" for VMs, which means that they provide all requested resources to a VM, if possible. Therefore, fairness in clouds has to be defined as constraining those VMs that overcharge their self-serving store, i.e., are greedy. While also the concept of greediness has no formal definition, it can be better defined and quantified with the information that is available in clouds.
Therefore, the problem statement for this paper reads as follows: The greediness of consumers can be defined and quantified based on their multi-resource self-servings. An allocation is fair in such a case, when (i) this quantification is aligned for all consumers and (ii) greedy consumers are constrained in favor of less greedy consumers.
IV. QUESTIONNAIRE
Fairness and greediness are intuitive concepts, i.e., they differ in their perceptions from person to person. Thus, a questionnaire was developed to evaluate their intuitive understanding and to justify empirically the design of this new Greediness Metric (GM). DRF's conformance with an intuitive understanding of fairness was also evaluated in this questionnaire, since (i) DRF is the most prominent approach for fairness in data centers and (ii) respective replies serve as checks for questionnaire reply qualities. Therefore, this questionnaire allows to derive a justified and intuitive understanding of fairness and greediness, for the case where little or no information about consumers' utility functions is available. As discussed above, avoiding any explicit information on utility functions was decided on purpose, because in case of clouds, utility functions are not known.
The questionnaire specified real-life scenarios in terms of three questions Q1, Q2, and Q3 to not distract participants by technical terms and let them fully concentrate on the question of fairness. For example, Q3 describes a scenario, where three bakers purchase together three ingredients for cakes. The bakers prepare different recipes and split the ingredients by putting them on a table from which every baker serves himself. This was done until at least one resource on the table was depleted, which prohibited the utilization of the other resources. While this is a specific scenario the underlying problem is generic: Common heterogenous resources are split among individuals with different demands by letting them serve themselves. This implies mutual trust and poses the question of how individuals, who could try to exploit the system, can be identified, that is, how disproportionate consumption can be defined. The transferability to clouds is evident: just as the bakers, VMs serve themselves from a pool of common resources (the resources of their host). Defining disproportionate consumption is necessary to prioritize moderate VMs in case of congestion.
Questionnaire participants had to chose between different options of allocations or define rankings of consumers. Additionally, participants were offered to explain their answers in text boxes. The questionnaire did not address any particular target group. Out of 721 participants, who started the questionnaire, 604 completed it.
A. Choosing the Most Fair Allocation (Q1) Q1 was designed to evaluate a key building block of DRF: the use of the L 1 norm to measure the value of a bundle, i.e., that the value of a bundle is defined solely by the resource that it contains in the largest proportion (c.f. Section IV-C1d). The scenario described covers two resources r 1 and r 2 of which six and twelve units where available, respectively These resources have to be allocated to three consumers c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 . c 1 only requires r 1 , c 2 only r 2 , and c 3 requires for each unit of r 1 two units of r 2 . This results in seven possible allocations to allocate all resources and do not give consumers resources they have no use for. However, most of these allocations are intuitively unfair, e.g., in two of these allocations at least one consumer receives no resources at all. Because the scenario describes that resources are requested in static ratios, it is transferable to allocation problems in data centers, where these static ratios of resource requests are the standard assumption [7] , [10] .
Participants were presented with four of the seven possible allocations (namely as listed in Table II ) and asked to choose the allocation that seemed most fair to them. The allocations to choose from were presented numerically and graphically to participants (cf. Appendix A). As mentioned, Table II shows the allocations participants had to choose from and the respective labels (allocation A11, A12, A13, and A14). As expected, A11 and A14 were only chosen by a minority of the 721 participants (0.4% and 1.1%, respectively) and most participants deterred between A12 and A13 (30.0% and 68.5%, respectively). The following arguments in support of A12 are summarized from textual comments received:
• c 1 and c 2 only compete with c 3 for resources, but not with one another. A fair allocation splits resources equally between those who contend for them.
• All receive an equal amount of what they want.
• This is the only allocation where nobody can complain that someone has more of the same resource.
• All consumers have equal utilities.
• When prices are introduced based on available units, this option gives the same value to all consumers. For the following reasons A13 was supported:
• When prices are introduced based on available units, this option gives the same value to all consumers.
• c 1 and c 2 receive 2/3 of one resource and c 3 1/3 of two resources, which makes 2/3 for everybody. On a similar note, some participants rejected A12, because c 3 gets as much as c 1 and c 2 combined.
• Because c 1 and c 2 only want one resource, they should get more of it than c 3 , as c 3 wants both resources.
• This option is the result of a simple auction or when all consumers get an equal share of both resources and then trade. • The range of numbers of units given to consumers is the smallest. In particular, for A13 the range is 4-6-8, while it is 3-6-9 for A12.
B. Allocating Based on Resource Requests (Q2)
Q2 was designed to validate how participants allocate scarce resources based on requests. This problem is relevant in clouds, because, when a host experiences congestion, it has to decide which requests to accept and which to delay or reject. In Q2 three resources r 1 , r 2 , and r 3 (for each eight units were available) had to be split between the two consumers c 1 and c 2 (cf. Appendix B). All three resources were initially contended, but the contention for r 1 can be resolved in bilateral negotiations, with c 1 receiving two units and c 2 six. However, these negotiations left open how r 2 and r 3 had to be allocated. c 1 demanded five units of both resources and c 2 demanded four units of both. Participants had to decide, whether one consumer has to cease both missing units or each consumer should cease one. Accordingly, the most fair option had to be chosen from allocations A21, A22, and A23 (cf. Table III) .
715 participants answered this question. From the information given by participants in the text boxes, the following frequent arguments were compiled, indicating the subjective perception of fairness.
A21 was supported by 13.9% of the participants with these arguments:
• Since r 1 is not under contention anymore, it does not need to be considered for the allocation of r 2 and r 3 . Consequently, c 1 and c 2 should get a fair, that is, equal, amount of r 2 and r 3 .
• Because c 2 receives more of the first resource, c 2 will probably also require more of the other resources, and thus should not be constrained on these.
• The consumer, who demands the greater amount of a contented resource, should cease the deficit, because relative to his demand this deficit is smaller than for someone who demands less. A22 was supported by 23.7% of the participants with this argument:
• Because c 1 gets 4 units less of the first resource compared to c 2 , c 1 should get four units more of the other resources. 62.4% of the participants supported A23 with this argument:
• Since r 1 is no more under contention, it does not need to be considered for the allocation of r 2 . Assuming that the demands reflect actual needs (rather than negotiating positions), the most fair thing to do is splitting the scarcity equally, i.e., both get one resource less than requested. C. Estimating Greediness (Q3)
Q3 as defined in was designed to collect information on how the greediness of consumers, who served themselves from a pool of common resources, is perceived. In addition, insights are collected on how proportionality and value of resource bundles is perceived, when no information about consumers' utility functions is available. Thus, Q3 is most important for the investigation of an intuitive fairness understanding, as it provides insights on how resources that different VMs on the same host utilize can be compared.
Q3-as defined in Appendix C-is based on three scenarios S31, S32, and S33, were three consumers c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 had served themselves from a pool of three common resources r 1 , r 2 , and r 3 (like VMs on the same host). To split these resources, each consumer had allocated himself a certain bundle as shown in Table IV . The three consumers had to be ranked according to how their greediness was perceived, all being based on the amounts the consumers had allocated themselves.
1) Metrics:
Many participants tackled Q3 by proposing a metric to assess the value of bundles. These metrics encompasses the following four: price, price⇥scarcity, price\scarcity, and DRF. a) Price: The price metric is the simplest metric and was often suggested by participants. The value of one unit of resource r i is defined as p/ ! r i , where p is a constant and ! r i is the number of units available of r i . The value of a bundle is the sum of values of its resources. For example, for p = 1 the value of c 2 's bundle in S31 is . This metric is equivalent to the sum-based-penalty function presented in [16] .
b) Price⇥scarcity (P⇥S): The price⇥scarcity metric is a natural extension of the price metric. The value of one unit of resource r i is defined as a(r i ) · p/ ! r i 2 , where a(r i ) is the amount that is allocated in total of r i . The value of a bundle is defined as the sum of values of those resources contained. For example, for p = 1 the value of c 2 's bundle in S31 is 2 · 10 12 2 + 1 · 6 9 2 + 5 · 9 9 2 = 29 54
. c) Price\scarcity (P\S): The price\scarcity metric is another natural extension of the price metric and defines the value of a resource just as the price metric. However, the value of a bundle is defined only over resources that are depleted, i.e., resources where a(r i ) = ! r i . For example, for p = 1 the value of c 2 's bundle in S31 is .
According to this DRF metric, the bundles of c 1 and c 2 in S33 are equally valuable. This tie is broken by considering the second biggest share in the bundles, wherefore c 1 's is more valuable.
2) Frequency Investigations: In this section numerical results of Q3 are discussed. For some rankings the free text indicated that the participant had assumed real life values of the resources and ranked the consumers accordingly. These rankings, as well as, incomplete rankings were removed, wherefore the presented results are based on 553 answers. Subsequently, consumer rankings are denoted by triplets. For example, when the first consumer is ranked moderate, the second consumer is ranked most greedy, and the third consumer is ranked least greedy, this is denoted by the triplet (2,1,3) . Figure 1 illustrates for each scenario how many participants selected each ranking and highlights the rankings that correspond to the metrics discussed in Section IV-C1. Table  V shows which ranking corresponds to which metric for the three scenarios. Furthermore, Table V provides the percentage of participants, that answered with the respective ranking (deduced directly form numbers of Figure 1 ).
Because these rankings given by most participants do not match the same metric over the three scenarios, Table VI shows the quantity of the sixteen most prominent combinations of rankings (which cover 79.6% of all participants). In addition to these combinations, three combinations were selected five and seven times each, two combinations were selected four and six times each, 4 combinations were selected three times, and 15 combinations were selected one and two times each.
D. Discussion 1) Choosing the Most Fair Allocation (Q1):
Only the first two arguments in favor of A12 are correct. The third argument (nobody can complain that someone has more of the same resource) is incorrect, because c 1 receives least of r 2 and c 2 least r 1 . The fourth argument (all consumers have equal utilities) lacks foundation, because nothing was said about utilities of consumers, only about ratios in which they request resources. The fifth argument states that all receive the same value, which is actually the case for A13. Therefore, the arguments given in text boxes in favor of A13 are more versatile and credible than those in favor of A12. Because A12 and A13 were chosen by 30.0% and 68.5% of the participants, respectively, that is, A13 was chosen more than 2.25 times as often as A12, it is concluded that A13 determines the intuitively fair allocation.
2) Allocating based on Requests (Q2): While supporters of A21 and A23 stated that the allocation of r 1 does not need to be considered, when allocating r 2 and r 3 , both concluded differently on how r 2 and r 3 should be allocated: supporters of A21 argued that it is fair to allocate the resources fair, i.e., give both an equal amount of the resources, while supporters of A23 argued that it is fair to allocate the deficit fair, i.e., give each consumer one resource less, although this means that c 2 receives two more additional. Allocating the deficit in a fair manner, was frequently justified by the assumption that demands reflect actual needs. In general, participants considered the information important, which consumer ceased more demands for r 1 and whether demands reflect actual needs or negotiation positions. Although A22 is most fair according to all metrics discussed in Section IV-C1, only 23.7% of participants selected it. In contrast, A23 was selected by 62.4% of participants, that is, almost three times as often. This shows that most participants consider it fair to allocate the deficit fairly and not the actual resources. Unfortunately, giving a larger amount of resources to consumers, who demand more, will give incentives to VMs to exaggerate demands, which is already sometimes the case [10] .
3) Estimating Greediness (Q3): Many participants stated to have struggled ranking the consumers, because no information was given about how efficiently these consumers used their resources. Unfortunately, such uncertainties are also present in clouds, where the performance of VMs can only in some cases be related to their resource consumption.
Numbers of Table V show that these rankings according to the four metrics presented in Section IV-C1 cover 90.7% (S31), 94.8% (S32), and 73.6% (S33) of the participants' rankings. Despite this high coverage it was often the case that a participant's ranking was conforming with different metrics over the three scenarios. The four most prominent combinations ( (2,1,3), (2,3,1), (2,3,1) ), ((1,2,3 ), (1,3,2), (2,3,1)), ((1,2,3) , (1, 3, 2) , (1,3,2)), and ((2,1,3), (3,2,1), (1, 2, 3) ) are conforming with DRF, P⇥S, Price, P\S, respectively. However, as discussed next, the two top combinations were often did not result from applying the respective metric.
The most prominent combination was chosen by 79 participants. Although this combination results from the DRF metric, only one participant argued according to DRF. Interestingly, participants who opted for this combination provided more often explanations than those who opted for other combinations. The most frequent argument was, that those who exceed their equal share of a resource are considered greedy. Thus, in S31 c 2 is the greediest due to the disproportional consumption of r 3 . Analog, in S32 and S33 c 3 is the greediest, because c 3 exceeds the equal share of r 2 by 50% and c 1 is the second greedy, because c 1 exceeds the equal share of r 1 by 33%. The combination of rankings chosen by 55 participants is conforming with the P⇥S metric. Applying this metric implies several calculations, but participants arrived at this ordering differently, as inferred from their comments: most ordered the consumers according to the overall amount they had used and broke the tie of c 1 and c 3 in S33 by c 3 's 50% overconsumption of r 2 . The combinations of rankings chosen by 43 and 32 participants are conforming with the price and P\S metric, respectively. Most participants stated that they had applied these metrics to arrive at the ranking. Note that, for the combination of the P\S metric, the ranking from S32 to S33 is inverted, where in S32 c 1 was least greedy and c 3 most greedy. Two participants already noted in their comments that this reordering is counter-intuitive, because c 1 actually takes up less resources in S33, while consumptions of the other two consumers are stable.
4) Implications for existing metrics:
Although the metrics discussed in Section IV-C1 cover the majority of participants rankings, none of these metrics captures an intuitive understanding of fairness: The P\S metric has a low conformance in S32 and S33 and for S33 results in the inverted ranking of S32, which means that consumers can decrease their ranking by adding additional resources to their bundle. This not only is counter-intuitive, but also gives incentives to consumers to consume more resources than needed. The Price metric has an insufficient conformance in S33 and identifies c 1 as "greediest" in S31, although c 1 does not cause the bottleneck, but precisely sticks to his equal share (a behavior that is considered humble in S32 and S33). The sum-and the root-based-penalty function presented in [16] result in the same rankings as the Price metric and, therefore, are also not satisfactory. Similar arguments can be made for the P⇥S metric.
The DRF metric is satisfactory at a first glance: For all three scenarios of Q3 it results in the most frequent ranking and also in the most frequent combination of rankings (cf. first body row of Table V and Table VI) . However, only one participant argued according to DRF, while the majority argued that those who exceed their equal share are greedy. Therefore, the high conformance of DRF stems rather from the fact that every consumer exceeds his equal share on at most one resource, which allows DRF to produce good results, because it only considers these resources. To show that DRF's approach to ignore all but one resource can lead to undesirable results, a sample allocation is presented in Table VII . For this allocation all other metrics discussed in Section IV-C1 give the inverse ranking of DRF. Also, according to the arguments made by the participants, the DRF ranking is unfair: DRF classifies c 1 as the consumer with the most valuable bundle, although c 1 only receives the least loaded resource. c 3 cedes no resource at all and receives most of the only scarce resource, but DRF classifies c 3 as most humble.
Q1 of the questionnaire identified A13 as the intuitively fair allocation, while the DRF-fair allocation is A12. Because Leontief utility functions are assumed in Q1, i.e., resources are required in static ratios, and DRF is defined based on this assumption, DRF should result in an intuitively fair allocation, when this assumption holds. Therefore, while DRF is often applied, when Leontief utility functions do not hold, Q1 shows that already for Leontief utility functions, DRF may result in allocations that are not intuitively fair. Moreover, consumers and resources can be added to this scenario, where consumer c i requests only resource r i (and as before one consumer requests all resources evenly). Thereby, the perceived unfairness of DRF can be increased arbitrarily, because the consumer requesting all resources would receive as much as all other consumers combined. In other words, DRF-fair allocations exist with a higher degree of intuitive unfairness. Due to these shortcomings of all metrics hitherto presented, a new Greediness Metric (GM) is developed and introduced. This GM is aligned with the arguments of participants and accordingly (i) results in the most frequent rankings for each of the three scenarios in Q3, (ii) classifies A13 as the most fair allocation, and (iii) gives the "correct" ranking for the allocation in Table VII .
V. GREEDINESS METRIC
The Greediness Metric (GM) maps each resource bundle in an allocation to a rational number that captures its value and, therefore, can be associated to the greediness of the consumer, who served himself the bundle. In that sense this GM serves the same purpose as the other metrics presented in Section IV-C1. The GM sums up, what exceeds the equal share in each bundle, according to the most frequent questionnaire's responses. However, it also deducts what is not consumed of the equal share and is handed over to other consumers instead.
Let R = (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m ) be a set of m resources, where resource r i 2 R is available in the amount of ! r i . An allocation of R to n consumers (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) can be denoted by a matrix A 2 R m⇥n 0 with P n j=1 a ij  ! r i , for all i 2 {1, 2, . . . , m}, where c j receives amount a ij of r i . The amount of r i that c j receives beyond his equal share is then a ij ! r i /n (if the difference is negative, c j does not utilize its entire equal share of the resource).
If a ij > ! r i /n, consumers other than c j have to cede some of their equal share of r i in order to enable c j 's share of r i . Therefore, the amount that exceeds c j 's equal share is added to the greediness of c j .
If a ij = ! r i /n, c j exactly receives his equal share, wherefore it does not change c j 's greediness. In particular, if a ij = ! r i /n for all i 2 {1, 2, . . . , m}, c j 's greediness is zero.
If a ij < ! r i /n, c j 's cession of r i is credited to c j , i.e., subtracted from c j 's greediness, to the extent that other consumers profit from this cession, which is the case, when they utilize r i beyond their equal share. This extension not only depends on how much of r i is utilized beyond the equal share by other consumers, but also on how much of r i is ceded by other consumers. Therefore, the credit factor for the cession of r i is the ratio of what is ceded of r i to what is consumed beyond the equal share of r i . To capture this notion formally, 
Multiplying the amount that c j cedes of r i with ↵(r i )/ (r i ) implements the considerations above. Therefore, the greediness of c j is defined as
where the factor n/(m· ! r i ) normalizes resource units. Section V-C discusses the normalization in detail. The offset o(i, j) for c j 's consumption of r i and defined as
Note that, if (r i ) = 0, no consumer cedes r i and, therefore, the else-part of Equation 2 is never reached (and no division by zero occurs). While
↵(ri)
(ri) in the else-part dynamically influences in dependence of the consumption of r i how much ceding r i is credited, this crediting is also statically adjusted by Parameter 2 [0, 1]. Section V-B discusses the choice of .
A. GM Examples
This section provides exemplary calculations of the GM for selected allocations of Q1 and Q3 of the questionnaire. Table VIII summarizes the GM results for Q1 and Q3 of the questionnaire.
1) A12:
In the scenario of Q1, one unit of r 1 has a normalized value of n/(m · ! r 1 ) = 3/(2 · 6) = 0.25 and one unit of r 2 has a normalized value of n/(m · ! r 2 ) = 3/(2 · 12) = 0.125. The equal shares are ! r 1 /3 = 6/3 = 2 and ! r 2 /3 = 12/3 = 4 for resource r 1 and r 2 , respectively. c 1 has a greediness of 
B. Choice of
This section discusses the choice of to fine-tune the greediness metric to best comply with the questionnaire results. The GM's design is inline with arguments given most frequently by the participants and already without the parameter (or, equivalently, = 1), the GM complies with the results of Q1 and S31 of the questionnaire. However, for S32 and S33, the GM results in the ranking (3,2,1) (cf. Table VIII), while the ranking most frequently selected by the participants is (2,3,1) (cf. Table V) . This mismatch for = 1 can be explained as follows: In S32 and S33, c 1 exceeds the equal share of r 3 by 33% but also cedes 50% of r 2 to c 3 , while c 2 is "neutral". Thus, while c 2 's greediness is zero independent of , c 1 has a negative greediness for = 1, i.e., for = 1, the GM ranks c 2 greedier than c 1 . However, most participants rated c 1 greedier than c 2 , because c 1 over-consumes r 3 while c 2 never exceeds the equal share. To account for this argument, regulates how strongly the ceding of resources is credited (in addition to the dynamic regulation by ↵(ri) (ri) ), where, the smaller is chosen, the harder it gets to compensate for exceeding the equal share.
To match the results of Q3, has to be chosen, such that ceding 33% of one resource and over-consuming 50% of another resource, results in a positive greediness, which is the case for < 2/3. However, also Q1 has implications for the choice of : As Table VIII shows, for A12 the GM results in a greediness of 0.125, 0.125, and 0.5, and for = 0.25 in 0.375, 0.375, and 0 Therefore, for = 0.25 both allocations allocations have a greediness range of 0.375, which indicates the same fairness for both allocations (the smaller the greediness range the fairer the allocation). However, in the questionnaire A13 was selected more than twice as often as most fair allocation (cf. Section IV-A) compared to A12. Therefore, must be chosen, such that the GM indicates a higher fairness for A13 compared to A12, which is the case for > 0.25. Therefore, the questionnaire results give the constraint 2 ] [. Within this range, = 0.5 is an appropriate choice, because of the following argument: A13 can be regarded as twice as fair as A12, because A13 got selected by approximately twice as many participants as fairest allocation (cf. Section IV-A). Therefore, must be selected such that the GM identifies A13 as twice as fair as A12, i.e., such that the greediness range of A13 is half the greediness range of A12. As Table VIII shows, this is the case for = 0.5.
When the GM is applied subsequently, the used value is denoted as superscript behind "GM". For example, when the GM with = 0.5 is applied, it is denoted as applying GM 0.5 .
C. Resource Normalization
Because different resources occur in different amounts, it is necessary to normalize the offsets before summation (cf. Equation 1). To do so, a normalization constant k > 0 needs to be fixed, such that k/ ! r i can be used as normalization factor for every r i 2 R. This section discusses two scenarios to motivate the choice of k.
1) Addition of consumers: Let A be an allocation of m resources to the consumers c 1 , . . . , c n and let es 2 R m >0 be the equal share. Add x times es resources and add x consumers of which each precisely consumes es resources. By this addition, neither the equal share changes nor changes the amount of available resources, i.e., the addition is neutral for the existing allocation. Therefore, the greediness of c 1 , . . . , c n should not change. To ensure this, k must increase proportionally to the number of consumers in the system, e.g., k = n before the x consumers are added and k = n + x thereafter.
2) Addition of resources: Let m = 1, i.e., there is only resource r 1 of which a certain amount is available. Let A 1 be an allocation of r 1 to n consumers. Add y resources and allocate each of these in the same ratio as A 1 allocates r 1 . Call this allocation A y . Then, proportionally A 1 and A y allocate all consumers the same share of overall resources. Therefore, the greediness of consumers should be the same for both allocations. To ensure this, k must decrease proportionally with the number of resources, e.g., k = 1 before the y resources are added and k = 1 y+1 after the y resources are added. 3) Implication: The considerations above are implemented in the GM by choosing k = n/m, where n is the number of consumers and m is the number of resources. This normalization constant could be multiplied by any constant greater zero to scale the resulting greediness. However, multiplying by such constant does not offer additional advantages.
D. Application to Clouds 1) Different Endowments: Above the GM was presented under the assumption that every consumer has the same endowment to the overall resources, wherefore the equal share was used to calculate how many resources consumers cede or overconsume. This section discusses the GM's generalization to individual endowments. To introduce individual endowments, ! r i /n is replaced by an individual endowment. The sum of endowments must not exceed the overall supply of resources but may be smaller. If the latter is the case,
⌘ , to avoid this credit factor becomes greater than 1.
This generalization to individual endowments is necessary for the application of the GM to clouds, because VMs have different configurations which must translate to different endowments. The individual endowment of a VM must, therefore, either be defined solely based on the VM's flavor or also based on the resources of the VM's host. In particular, if the latter approach is taken, the endowment can be calculated by partitioning the host resources to the hosted VMs, where VMs receive resources in proportion to their virtual/configured resources. For example, assume a host with 3 GHz and 6GB of hosts two VM 1 and VM 2. VM 1 has 2 VCPU and 4 GB of virtual RAM and VM 2 has 1 VCPU and also 4 GB of virtual RAM. Then the endowment of VM 1 is 2 GHz and 3 GB of RAM and VM 2's endowment is 1GHz and 3GB of RAM.
2) Cloud-wide application: This section discusses how the GM is deployed to enforce fairness between users sharing a cloud. This deployment consists of the following steps that are repeated constantly. 1) Each host calculates the greediness of the VMs that are hosted.
2) The results are announced to the controller node or to all other hosts in a decentralized manner. 3) For each customer the greediness of his VMs is aggregated. 4) Each host regulates the resource access of all hosted VMs, based on the greediness of the respective VM and the greediness of the user owning the VM. Different functions to implement the aggregation in Step 3 may be chosen. The function used in Section VI is the sum function, i.e., the greediness of a user is the sum of greediness of his VMs. In Step 4, VMs are assigned priorities to regulate their access to host resources. The priority of a VM is based on the greediness of the customer, who owns the VM. Furthermore, while CPU, Disk I/O and network access are time-shared and can, therefore, be allocated by priorities, RAM is space-shared and can therefore only be allocated by assigning limits. Because it is less flexible to allocate a resource by limits than by priorities, the best suited allocation of RAM needs to be investigated.
3) Incentive Advantages of the VM: This section discusses advantages of the GM compared to the other metrics discussed in Section IV-C1, when applied to ensure fairness in clouds. Unlike these, the GM gives incentive to customers to estimate the resource requirements of their VMs as precise as possible. In particular, the GM gives incentive to chose the configuration of a VM, such that it matches the VMs subsequent load: When a VM tries to exceed the resources it is configured with, it will receive them, if available. However, the customer's greediness will increase with a potentially negative effect on other VMs of the customer. Because a customer's greediness only decreases, when the resources that his VMs did not utilize are utilized by other VMs, it is not guaranteed that unitized resources are credited to the consumer. Therefore, under-, as well as, over-provisioning VMs is costly. No other metric, known so far by today, provides this incentive: when the Price or Price⇥Scarcity metric is deployed to quantify VM consumption, the cost of customers increases as their VMs utilize resources unrelated to the configuration of the VMs. Therefore, customers have no incentive to fine-tune the configuration of their VMs. When the resource utilization of VMs is unrelated to their configuration, this decreases the cloud's load balancing. In particular, VMs are scheduled based on their configuration, i.e., more "small" than "big" VMs will be scheduled to a host. However, when small VMs face high load, because their owners have no incentive to choose an appropriate configuration, many hosts will become congested. As shown for Scenarios S32 and S33, the price\scarcity metric even provides an incentive to overspend resources. With the DRF metric, a VM's resource consumption can be related to its configuration. However, because DRF only considers the dominant resource, customers have no incentive to handle other resources economically.
Therefore, the newly developed GM does not only ensure the fair sharing of a cloud, but also gives incentive to customers to wisely configure their VMs. Such an approach allows for the deployment of the cloud efficiently.
VI. EVALUATION
This section investigates how the fairness in clouds increases, when resources are allocated according to the GM policy instead of the standard policy. Many existing simulator tools model several resources in the VM scheduling process, especially, the decision, which VM will be started on which host, is made depending on several resources. However, upon simulating the runtime of VMs, only the CPU time is considered. Thus, basic dependencies between CPU time, RAM, disk I/O, and network access are not simulated in existing simulator tools. Therefore, for the initial investigation of the GM, a basic simulator was implemented in Python and is described next.
A. Simulator Design
A simulation is defined by a setup that consists of VMs V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v p }, customers C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n }, and hosts H = {h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h q }. Every VM in V is owned by one customer in C and hosted by one host in H. No customer/host in C/H owns/hosts VMs that are not in V
In the discussed simulations, every host hosts at most one VM of every customer, wherefore a VM is uniquely identified by its owner and host. This allows to increase readability by denoting VM v 2 V with C(v) = c b and
The simulator allocates resources according to Leontief utility functions, i.e., VMs receive resources in the ratio of their demand vector. The extension of the experiments to more complex utility functions is future work. Throughout the simulations, the global supply, which is the sum of the supplies of all hosts ( P h2H A(h)), is used to normalize resources.
B. Allocation Policies
This discusses the allocation policies that are applied to a setup to generate an allocation. 1) Standard policy: VMs run as processes on their host. Therefore, VMs sharing a host are allocated resources according to the kernel policy. The following mechanism outlines a straight-forward policy to allocate resources to processes with Leontief utility functions: The available resources are allocated equally and each consumer utilizes the maximum amount of this equal share. Because Leontief utility functions are assumed, one resource will limit the utilization of the other resources for each consumer. The resources that are not utilized are pooled and allocated in the same manner. This procedure repeats until (100 ✏)% of one resource is utilized (in some cases the procedure would have to run indefinitely to allocate all resources). This mechanism provides sharing incentive, is strategy-proof and ensures envy-freeness. Because (100 ✏)% of one resource may remain unallocated, the mechanism is not Pareto-efficient.Pareto-efficiency can be added by allocating the remaining (100 ✏)% of the limiting resource (and an proportional amount of the other resources) to an arbitrary customer that demands it. However, then the envy-freeness property is lost. Fig. 2 : To quantify the fairness of multi-resource allocations, in Step 1 the bundle of each consumer is mapped to a scalar with the Price, DRF, or Greediness metric, and in Step 2 the fairness of the resulting vector is quantified by Jain's index.
The standard policy is defined by applying this mechanism on every host to allocate the available resources to the hosted VMs.
2) GM x policy: For x 2 [0, 1], the GM x policy allocates resources to the VMs, such that (i) VMs receive resources in the ratio of their demand vector, (ii) no VM receives more resources than requested, and (iii) the minimal greediness of customers is maximized. The greediness of a customer is defined as the sum of greediness of his VMs (cf. Section V-D2). The greediness of VMs is defined by applying the GM x per host while using the global supply to normalize resources. The Algorithm to find such allocation will be discussed in a future paper.
C. Comparison Method
Because there is no best practice to quantify the fairness of multi-resource allocations, the following two-step approach, which is illustrated in Figure 2 , is taken. 1)
Step 1: In the Step 1, the resources each customer receives are mapped to a scalar by the following three metrics: Asset metric The resources received by the VMs of a customer are added up (resulting in a vector) and normalized by the global supply (resulting in a vector). The result is the sum of the elements of the second vector. DRF metric The resources received by the VMs of a consumer are added up (resulting in a vector) and normalized by the global supply (resulting in a vector). The largest element in this vector is the result. GM x metric The greediness of each VM is determined per host according to GM x , while using the global supply to normalize resources. For each customer, the greediness of his VMs is added up and the quota the customer does not utilize is subtracted (normalized by the global supply). Even without the subtraction of the unused quota, this may result in a negative number. Because only nonnegative numbers are suitable in the Step 2, the sum of the initial quota normalized by the global supply vector is added to the result, ensuring nonnegative numbers.
2)
Step 2: Each of these metrics in Step 1 results in a vector with a nonnegative entry for each consumer, which quantifies the received resources. Because the quantification of singleresource allocations is well researched [18] , [14] , the fairness of the vectors resulting from Step 1 is quantified by Jain's index [14] in Step 2. However, other functions would be also feasible (cf. [18] ). Therefore, for each metric in Step 1, Step 2 results in a number q 2 [0, 1] that quantifies the fairness.
D. Notations
When GMs with different parameters are enumerated, "GM x,y,z " is written instead of GM x , GM y , GM z . Let s be a setup. An allocation a generated by the standard (respectively, GM x ) policy is referred to as the "standard (respectively, GM x ) allocation for s". Let q be the number that results from the comparison method described in Section VI-C, when metric M 2 {GM x , asset, DRF} is applied in Step 1. Then, the M fairness of a is q. Furthermore, when a is the standard (respectively, GM x ) allocation, then "the standard (respectively, GM x ) policy has M fairness q (for s)".
E. Simulation 1: Exchange of Resources on the Same Host
In this setup (cf. Figure 3) there are two resources r 1 and r 2 , one host h a , with A(h a ) = (30, 30), and three customers c d , c e , c f , which all have quota (20, 20) and own VM v a . However, for < 1, the GM does not allow perfect swapping, because ceding is not rewarded as strong as over-consuming is punished. Therefore, the smaller , the more resource-swapping increases greediness. Because the GM policy maximizes the minimal greediness in the system, for every swap between v d a and v e a , v f a has to receive a certain amount of resources, such that v f a 's greediness increases equally. However, the GM 0 allocation shows that, even when ceding resources is not credited at all, the resulting GM allocation is still more "balanced" then the standard/DRF allocation.
F. Simulation 2: Cross Host Alignment
For Simulation 2 the setup of Simulation 1 is extended by adding one host that hosts two additional VMs (cf. Figure 3) . The additional host, h b , has the same capacities as h a . The additional VMs, v a is starved by all GM policies for the following reason. Customer c e is the only customer that only runs one VM, wherefore c e does not use the entire quota to instantiate VMs. This unused quota is deducted from c e 's greediness. Because, the GM policies maximize the minimum greediness, it is critical to increase c e 's greediness. This can only be done by allocating as many resources as possible to c e 's only VM. However, this implies starving c f 's VM on h a , and compensating c f via h b . While the allocation on h a is the same for all GMs, the allocation on h b depends on . This is because c f is forced to cede all resources on h a , but the amount with which the ceding is credited changes depending on . In particular, GM 1 gives c f full credit for the forced ceding on h a and accordingly c f 's share of h b is larger than for smaller . Even though for G 0 c f does not receive credit for ceding on h a , c f 's share of h b is greater than for the standard allocation. This is because because c d exceeds its endowment on h a and therefore gets less on h b .
Because it is neither realistic nor desirable to completely starve VMs, a starvation factor s is introduced. The starvation factor defines the fraction of a VM's endowment that the VM is guaranteed to receive (given it demands the resources). Starvation factors that depend on the customers greediness were also investigated, i.e., the greedier the customer, the smaller the starvation factor for his VMs becomes. However, for these "dynamic" starvation factors dependencies get more complex and are therefore discussed in a future paper. Figure  6 shows the GM 0,0. Figure 4 , whereat the fairness of the GM 0,0.5,1 allocations is given relatively to the standard fairness. Table IX compares the asset, DRF, and GM 0,0.5,1 fairness of Simulation 1. A body cell shows the M fairness of the P allocation, where M and P are given by leftmost column and top row, respectively. The fairness of the GM 0,0.5,1 allocations is stated relatively to the fairness of the standard allocation. For example, the first body row states, that the GM 1 fairness of the standard allocation is 0.889 and the GM 1 fairness of the GM 0,0.5,1 allocations are 0.889 + 0.111, 0.889 + 0.105, and 0.889 + 0.097, respectively. Table X compares the fairness of the different allocations of Simulation 2 in the same manner.
G. Discussion
Unsurprisingly, Table IX shows that the GM x fairness of the GM x allocation is perfect, i.e., 1, for x 2 {0, 0.5, 1}. More interestingly, all GM allocations have higher asset fairness than the standard allocation. Because the standard allocation would also result from allocating the resources according to DRF, the standard allocation achieves perfect DRF fairness. Therefore, in terms of DRF fairness, the standard allocation outperforms all GM allocations. However, as Table X shows, in Simulation 2 all GM allocations outperform the standard allocation in terms of any fairness. This is because the GM metrics, contrary to the standard policy, allocate resources on individual hosts also based on the allocation on other hosts. Table X also shows that with increasing starvation factor s the GM 0,0.5,1 and asset fairness of the GM allocation decreases. This is because a higher starvation factor leaves the GM policies less flexibility to allocate resources. However, even for the worse case in terms of flexibility left by starvation limits, i.e., s = 1, the fairness is increased by 6 to 6.8 %. For the best case, i.e., s = 0, the GM 0,0.5,1 policies are able to increase the GM 1 and asset fairness by 13.9, 14.8, and 14.9%, respectively. VII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK Multi-resource fairness for the runtime allocation of cloud resources was so far not discussed in literature and not defined satisfactorily. Therefore, the new Greediness Metric (GM) was defined based on the results of a questionnaire on the intuitive understanding of fairness among more than 600 participants. This questionnaire also revealed that other approaches to multiresource fairness in clouds are not always conform with an intuitive understanding of fairness; this includes DRF, which is the most prominent approach. Because the GM is based on arguments of non-technical participants it is intuitively comprehensible. This makes the GM attractive to be marketed to cloud flat rate customers, as a guarantee to receive the fair share of the leased cloud can be granted.
The GM maps the resource utilization of VMs to a number that quantifies the proportionality of the VMs' resource consumption. By summing up these numbers for customers and allocating resources to VMs based on the sums of their owners, cloud-wide fairness between customers can be achieved. This allows to define fairness without utility functions It was shown by simulations, that already for small clouds, the GM outperforms the standard allocation policy in terms of fairness.
However, it also revealed that implementation details still require further research. Figure 5 and Figure 6 , whereat the fairness of the GM 0,0.5,1 allocations is given relatively to the standard fairness. Figure 7 shows the illustrations of A11, A12, A13, and A14 displayed to participants in Q1 of the questionnaire. The question was phrased as follows:
Three children have six colored pencils and twelve cardboard boxes to play with. Because they do not get along well, their nursery teachers decide that they should play on their own, wherefore the painting materials have to be divided among them while taking into account the three following preferences.
• Child A wants to color, wherefore he only wants pencils (as many as possible).
• Child B wants to build cardboard houses, wherefore she only wants cardboard boxes (as many as possible).
• Child C wants to color cardboard boxes, wherefore for each pencil he receives, he wants two cardboard boxes to color (Child C wants as many of these sets as possible). The nursery teachers are unsure how to allocate the pencils and cardboard boxes among the children and must decide between the following four options.
Here the allocations were displayed by the illustrations shown in Table 7 and by tables that depicted the allocations numerically.
Which allocation do you think is the fairest?
B. Allocating based on Requests (Q2) Figure 9 shows the illustrations of A21, A22, and A23 displayed to participants in Q2 of the questionnaire. The question was phrased as follows:
Human resources of a company are being redistributed. The department heads of two competing subsidiaries A and B must come to an agreement on how 8 account managers, 8 programmers, and 8 administrators are assigned to their departments. The professional groups' workforce does not suffice to meet the department heads' demands simultaneously, which leads to difficult negotiations. After these negotiations, they have almost reached an agreement as depicted in the following table.
In particular, the table shows how many professionals the subsidiaries demand after the negotiations. Initially, the demands for accountant managers also exceeded their availability, but this issue was resolved during the negotiations. Here the Table in Figure 8 was shown.
Since there is still one programmer and one administrator missing to implement the demands, the corporate management has to decide which of the subsidiaries gets one programmer and one administrator less than requested. Since the two subsidiaries are competing, the management wants to find a fair solution.
What do you think is the fairest solution?
• Subsidiary A gets one programmer and one administrator less. (Option A) • Subsidiary B gets one programmer and one administrator less. (Option B) • One subsidiary gets one programmer less, the other gets one administrator less. (Option C) Here the illustrations in Figure 9 were shown. Figure 10 shows the illustrations of S31, S32, and S33 displayed to participants in Q3 of the questionnaire. The question was phrased as follows:
C. Estimating Greediness (Q3)
Three bakers each want to bake a cake. To save money, they buy the ingredients (eggs, butter, and flour) together. However, because each baker is using a different recipe, each baker needs a different amount of ingredients.
To split the ingredients, they put the ingredients on a table and each baker helps himself. After a while at least one ingredient is depleted, wherefore the bakers cannot use more of the remaining ingredients; in other words, the ingredients left on the table cannot be utilized due to the lack of depleted ingredients.
In the following, three scenarios are depicted with what the bakers took from the table and what was available initially. Each scenario is depicted by a table and a graphic, which both demonstrate how much the bakers took of each ingredient. Rank the three bakers according to how you perceive their greediness based on the amounts they have used.
Here the allocations were displayed by the illustrations shown in Table 10 and by tables that depicted the allocations numerically.
